Economists love their alphabet. They describe business cycles as L-shaped (down, then flat), U-shaped (gradually down, then up), V-shaped (the same but sharply) or W-shaped (a V with a hiccup). Since covid-19, some have latched on to another letter. The post-pandemic recovery, economic pessimists feared, would resemble a K: up for some (the wealthy), down for others (the poor). Since then, especially in America, concerns about the "K-shaped economy", where spending by the super-rich is all that is stopping today's boom from turning to bust, have lingered.

经济学家对字母情有独钟。 他们用字母来描述商业周期：L形（先下降，然后保持平稳）、U形（逐渐下降，然后上升）、 V形（同样走势但更为急剧）或W形（带有波折的V形）。 自新冠疫情以来，一些经济学家又盯上了另一个字母。 经济悲观主义者担心，疫情后的经济复苏将呈现“K形”：部分人（富人）的情况好转，而另一部分人（穷人）的情况恶化。 自那以后，尤其是在美国，人们一直担忧“K形经济”， 即超级富豪的消费是阻止当前经济繁荣转向衰退的唯一因素。

In recent months these have proliferated, cropping up in everything from Google searches to corporate filings and earnings calls. Every time the economic data show signs of weakness—as on March 6th, when the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) reported a net loss of 92,000 jobs in February—the worries mount further. If the shape of the American economy indeed hinges on the behaviour of a small elite, who could tighten their purse strings at any moment, that would be something to fret about. So does it?

近几个月来，这种担忧愈发普遍，从谷歌搜索到企业文件和财报电话会议，到处都能看到相关内容。 每当经济数据出现疲软迹象时——比如3月6日， 美国劳工统计局（BLS）报告称2月净减少9.2万个工作岗位——人们的担忧就会进一步加剧。 如果美国经济的走势确实取决于一小部分精英的行为，而他们随时可能收紧钱包， 那确实值得担忧。 但事实真的如此吗？

The often repeated statistic behind the K is that about half of America's spending now comes from the highest-earning 10%. The figure has been hawked most prominently by Moody's Analytics. The research firm also finds that the share of spending by the top 20% has gone up from 55% in 2019 to 59% in 2025. At face value, this points to a worrying imbalance. Happily, it is almost certainly wrong.

支撑“K形”说法的一个常被引用的统计数据是，美国约一半的消费支出现在来自收入最高的10%人群。 这一数据主要由穆迪分析公司大力宣扬。 该研究公司还发现，收入最高的20%人群的消费占比从2019年的55%上升到2025年的59%。 从表面上看，这表明存在令人担忧的不平衡。 不过，好在这几乎肯定是不准确的。

Moody's starts out by estimating income and saving by income bracket, and then deriving each bracket's spending as the difference between the two. Income is calculated by applying each bracket's share of income, as reported in the Federal Reserve's Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) conducted every three years and adjusted for tax rates, to an aggregate income figure for all groups from the quarterly national accounts.

穆迪分析公司的计算方法是，先按收入阶层估算收入和储蓄，然后将两者之差作为各收入阶层的消费支出。 收入的计算方法是， 将美联储每三年进行一次的消费者金融调查（SCF）中报告的各收入阶层收入占比（并根据税率进行调整）， 应用到季度国民账户中所有群体的总收入数据上。

To arrive at its figures for saving, Moody's combines the SCF, which also reports asset holdings by income bracket, with the Fed's quarterly financial accounts, which aggregate all American households' purchases of various assets (cash, property, stocks etc). Total saving for all households is easy to calculate by adding these up.

为了得出储蓄数据，穆迪分析公司将消费者金融调查（该调查还报告了各收入阶层的资产持有情况） 与美联储的季度金融账户（汇总了美国家庭购买各类资产（现金、房产、股票等）的情况）相结合。 将所有这些加起来，很容易就能计算出所有家庭的总储蓄。

Apportioning total saving by income group is less straightforward. Moody's assumes that a bracket's share of purchases of a particular asset type exactly mirrors the bracket's historic share of that asset as reported in the last SCF. So if the top 10% of households by income held around 70% of all equities in 2022, they are thought to account for 70% of Americans' purchases of equities since then.

然而，按收入阶层分配总储蓄就没那么简单了。 穆迪分析公司假设，某一收入阶层购买某类资产的占比，恰好与该阶层在最近一次消费者金融调查中报告的该类资产持有占比相同。 因此，如果按收入划分，收入最高的10%家庭在2022年持有约70%的股票， 那么从那时起，他们就被认为占美国人购买股票的70%。

Using historical shares of income to impute subsequent shares is questionable. Using historical shares of the stock of wealth to impute subsequent flow of saving is even more so (new homebuyers do not look like existing homeowners, for example). Besides, households' behaviour can change: low-earners have become zealous retail stock-traders. Any estimate of the gap between two questionable figures is therefore doubly dubious.

用历史收入占比来推断后续收入占比值得商榷， 而用历史财富存量占比来推断后续储蓄流量则更不合理（例如，新房购买者与现有房主的情况并不相同）。 家庭行为可能会发生变化：低收入者已成为狂热的零售股票交易者。 因此，对两个值得怀疑的数据之间的差距进行任何估算，其可靠性都要大打折扣。

A less convoluted way to determine how much Americans of various sorts are spending is to ask them. The BLS does this annually, though the figures come out with a delay. Economists at Barclays, a bank, have crunched these survey numbers and adjusted them for under-responding by the rich. They conclude that as of a few years ago, the highest-earning 20% of Americans accounted for just over a third of the spending.

确定各类美国人消费支出的一个更直接的方法是直接询问他们。 美国劳工统计局每年都会这样做，尽管数据公布会有延迟。 巴克莱银行的经济学家对这些调查数据进行了分析，并针对富人回应不足的情况进行了调整。 他们得出的结论是，截至几年前，收入最高的20%美国人仅占消费支出的略高于三分之一。

This share also looks extraordinarily stable. Figures for the past few years have not been published yet, but before that they were more or less flat for decades, even in the tumult of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 and the covid-19 pandemic. If those two upheavals did not alter the proportions, it is hard to think of something that could. When Barclays looked at whether spending categories favoured by the rich (like restaurants) or poor (like petrol) rose fastest, the conclusion was that the share of spending by the most loaded crept down slightly in 2025.

这一占比看起来也非常稳定。 过去几年的数据尚未公布，但在此之前， 即便在2007至2009年全球金融危机和新冠疫情的动荡时期，这一占比几十年来也基本保持平稳。 如果这两场动荡都没有改变这一比例，那么很难想象还有什么因素能改变它。 当巴克莱银行研究富人偏爱的消费类别（如餐厅）或穷人偏爱的消费类别（如汽油）哪个增长更快时， 得出的结论是，2025年最富有人群的消费占比略有下降。

Figures from other sources do not look K-ish, either. Consumer Edge, a data provider, estimates spending based on credit- and debit-card use. According to these numbers, the gap in spending growth between the rich and the rest has gone back and forth in the past few years, averaging about zero. Retail-spending figures from the New York Fed similarly do not show that well-heeled shoppers have been abnormally spendthrift lately.

其他来源的数据也不支持“K形”说法。 数据提供商Consumer Edge根据信用卡和借记卡的使用情况来估算消费支出。 根据这些数据，过去几年里，富人与其他人群的消费增长差距来回波动， 平均约为零。 纽约联储的零售消费数据同样显示，近期富裕消费者的消费并未异常挥霍。

Going /-shaped

走向反斜杠走势

Most important, little else in the economy points to a shift towards the wealthy. The wages of low-earners are growing at a similar rate to those of richer ones—and grew much faster in the post-pandemic years. In surveys of consumer confidence, the gap between the mood of the poor and that of the rich is no wider than usual.

最重要的是，经济中的其他方面几乎没有迹象表明出现向富人倾斜的转变。 低收入者的工资增长速度与高收入者相近，而且在疫情后的几年里增长更快。 在消费者信心调查中，穷人与富人的情绪差距并不比平常更宽。

As for assets, the New York Fed shows that since the pandemic the net worth of rich households has not outpaced that of the less well-off. The fortunes of the wealthy have soared recently, but only after crashing when markets slumped in 2022 as the Fed raised interest rates. The wealth of poorer Americans has grown more slowly but also more steadily.

至于资产方面，纽约联储的数据显示，自疫情以来，富裕家庭的净资产增长并未超过不太富裕的家庭。 富人的财富最近大幅飙升，但那是在2022年美联储加息导致市场下跌、财富缩水之后才出现的。 较贫穷美国人的财富增长较慢，但也更稳定。

To be sure, America's economy is fairly unequal by rich-world standards, as well as being unusually fast growing. But that is nothing new—and therefore, at least from a macroeconomic point of view, nothing much to worry about.

诚然，以富裕国家的标准来看，美国经济相当不平等，而且增长速度也异常快。 但这并非新现象，因此至少从宏观经济角度来看，并无太多值得担忧之处。